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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates economic aspects of the measurement of fiscal 
decentralisation to establish how a nation’s fiscal arrangements can be consistently 
measured, so they can be compared internationally. A new index of fiscal decentralisation 
is developed that reflects two key elements of the theory of fiscal decentralisation: the 
fiscal autonomy of subnational governments; and their fiscal importance. The role of 
fiscal inequality in subnational governments’ public finances is also considered. 
  
The thesis consists of nine chapters which are distinct but closely related. These 
nine chapters can be divided into the three “building blocks”: 
•  An overview of the economics of fiscal decentralisation, which lays the 
foundation for the development of the fiscal decentralisation index. 
•  The development of a new fiscal decentralisation index (“FDI”). This FDI 
reflects fundamental aspects of the economics of fiscal decentralisation 
and provides the basis for consistent international comparisons. 
•  The measurement of the degree of fiscal decentralisation in the cases of 
Vietnam, China, and other selected ASEAN nations. This application is, in 
large part, a response to the calls from international organisations for 
developing countries to pursue policies that increase fiscal 
decentralisation. 
  
The thesis makes three contributions to the literature: (i) the development and 
application of a new index of fiscal decentralisation; (ii) the development of a framework 
for the analysis of subnational fiscal inequality that can also be included in fiscal indices 
in the future studies; and (iii) the identification of policy implications for fiscal 
decentralisation reforms in Vietnam.    iii
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THE THESIS FORMAT 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters, including the “Introduction” and 
“Conclusion” chapters. Each chapter has been written in a more or less self-contained 
way for readers’ convenience. As a result, some repetition of relevant material between 
chapters, figures, and tables is unavoidable. However, this repetition is kept to a 
minimum. 
 
A typical chapter contains a number of sections. A list of references is at the end 
of the thesis. Some chapters contain appendices. The sections and appendices in each 
chapter are numbered at two levels: X.Y for sections and AX.Y for appendices. For the 
section, the first level, X, indicates the Chapter X, whereas the second level indicates the 
order of occurrence of the section within the chapter. Similarly for appendices, the first 
letter A means “Appendix”. 
 
Equations within the chapter are also labelled by two levels in the bracket (Y.Z). 
It is important to note that the chapter level, X, does not enter into the numbering of the 
equations. For example, equation (Y.Z) means that it is the 
th Z  equation in Section X.Y. 
In some cases, when we have to refer to the equation in another chapter, we use the 
terminology of “equation (Y.X) in Chapter X”. 
 
A similar way of labelling tables and figures is applied, such as Table X.W, where 
W refers to the order of occurrence of the table/figure within Chapter X.    
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“Decentralisation has, not only an administrative value, but also a 
civic dimension, since it increases the opportunities for citizens to 
take interest in public affairs; it makes them get accustomed to 
using freedom. And from the accumulation of these local, active, 
pernickety freedoms, is born the most efficient counterweight 
against the claims of the central government, even if it were 
supported by an impersonal, collective will.” 
A.  De Tocqueville (1805-1859) 
in “A History of Decentralisation”, World Bank (2003) 
 
 
The term “fiscal decentralisation” refers to the devolution of authority for public 
finances and the delivery of government services from the national to subnational levels 
(Tanzi, 1996). This devolution is related to the four main interrelationships among levels 
of government regarding fiscal issues, viz., the responsibility for (i) expenditure 
decisions; (ii) taxing and revenue-raising powers; (iii) subnational borrowings; and (iv) 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Fiscal decentralisation is currently an issue of 
considerable practical importance facing many developing economies and has been 
advocated by international economic bodies, such as the World Bank and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (World Bank, 2003). 
Moreover, the academic study of fiscal decentralisation is a field of vigorous research 
activity and a number of attempts have been made to systematically understand the key 
economic principles of this area (see, e.g., Bird, 2004; Boadway, 2003; Collins, 2001; 
McLure, 1998).  
 
As one way to measure professional interest in the area of “fiscal federalism”, the 
field of study within which fiscal decentralisation falls, the number of publications of 
articles can be used. As a benchmark for the purpose of comparison, we use the number 
of publications in five other fields of economic research, viz., “unemployment”, 
“inflation”, “exchange rate”, “interest rate”, and “foreign direct investment”. As these 
five fields are much broader than fiscal federalism, we should expect that the number of   2
publications on those topics to be much larger than for fiscal federalism. But this 
difference in scale disappears if we use changes over time. Figure 1.1 plots on the left-
hand axis the number of articles published which include at least one of these six fields in 
their key words. The three bars for each field indicate the number of publications in three 
consecutive decades. As the left-hand axis uses a logarithmic scale, the change in the 
height of the bars from one decade to the next indicates the growth rate in publications. 
Thus, for unemployment, for example, the average annual rate of growth in publications 
over the three decades is about 17 per cent, which is read with respect to the right-hand 
axis. The number of publications in fiscal federalism is much smaller than those for the 
other topics, as expected, but the area is growing rapidly. In fact, with an average growth 















































































































Note: The average annual growth rates are the logarithmic differences in the number of publications from 
one decade to the next, divided by 10.  
Source: http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx. Keyword search conducted in January 2008. 
 
A persistent challenge in this field concerns the measurement of the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation in a manner that conveys an accurate signal of fiscal arrangements 
and is consistent with the theory of fiscal decentralisation. This thesis develops indices 
FIGURE 1.1 
 





 (Per cent p.a.)   3
that meet these challenges and take into account the two main issues of fiscal 
decentralisation: (i) the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments (hereafter SNGs), 
the extent to which subnational expenditure is funded by subnational own-sourced 
revenue; and (ii) the fiscal importance of subnational governments, the extent to which 
national fiscal activities are undertaken by SNGs. These indices also reflect the impact of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and ideas associated with “fiscal inequality” of the 
distribution of revenue and expenditure.  
 
The structure of this introductory chapter is as follows. Section 1.1 discusses 
previous approaches to measuring fiscal decentralisation. Section 1.2 presents a brief 
overview of our indices of fiscal decentralisation. The application of these indices is 
illustrated with numerical examples in Section 1.3. The contributions of the study are 
summarised in Section 1.4, and Section 1.5 sets out the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1  Measuring fiscal decentralisation 
 
In recent decades, fiscal decentralisation has become a central concern in 
countries around the world, especially in developing nations such as Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, and Nigeria; and countries in transition such 
as Bulgaria, China, Hungary, and Russian Federation (IMF, 1997; Bird, 1993). Fiscal 
arrangements among levels of government have been reformed in a manner that increases 
the extent to which SNGs are assigned more expenditure and revenue-raising 
responsibilities. There is, however, a lack of a widely-accepted tool to measure the degree 
of fiscal decentralisation across countries. In previous studies, typically either revenue or 
expenditure from subnational governments is used without taking into account the fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs. For example, in his pioneering study, Oates (1972) uses the national 
government’s share in total public revenue as the degree of fiscal centralisation. More 
recently, Woller and Phillips (1998) measure fiscal decentralisation in one of four ways:  
  the ratio of local government revenues to total government revenues  
  the ratio of local revenues less grants-in-aid to total government revenues  
  the ratio of local expenditures to total government expenditures   4
  the ratio of local government expenditures to total government expenditures 
less defence and social security expenditures.  
Similar measures of fiscal decentralisation can be found in Thieben (2003), Akai and 
Sakata (2002), Lin and Liu (2000), Yilmaz (1999), Davoodi and Zou (1998), and Zhang 
and Zoo (1998), to name a few. None of these measures consider the autonomy of SNGs 
in their fiscal activities. In short, the linkage between “theory” and “measurement” is 
poor in much of the current literature. 
  
Our research is designed to bring about closer matching of the theory and 
measurement of fiscal decentralisation. The specific goals of this study are to: 
  develop an index to measure and compare the degree of fiscal decentralisation 
across countries in a manner that is reliable and consistent with fiscal theory  
  compare and contrast these newly-developed indices with other measures of 
fiscal decentralisation  
  apply our indices to China, Vietnam and other selected ASEAN nations, and 
to identify policy implications for Vietnam’s fiscal decentralisation. 
   
1.2  Indices of fiscal decentralisation 
 
We attack the problem of measuring fiscal decentralisation by developing two 
indices. The first index is the fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation (FDI) which 
takes account of the first-order issues of fiscal decentralisation: the fiscal autonomy and 
fiscal importance of SNGs. The second is the enhanced index of fiscal decentralisation 
(eFDI), which extends the FDI to account for the second-order issues of the effects of 
unconditional grants and borrowings by SNGs on subnational fiscal autonomy. In what 
follows, we shall briefly describe each index. 
 
1.2.1  The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation (FDI) 
 
For a particular nation, suppose there are P  subnational regions to be indexed by 
1,..., . iP =  These subnational regions could be states of a federal country or provinces of   5
a unitary nation. Let  1,..., P E E  be expenditure by the subnational regions, so that total 
subnational expenditure is 
1 .
P
i i E E




i i OSR OSR
= =∑ , where  i OSR  is an own-sourced revenue of subnational region i. In 
addition, let TE  represent total public sector expenditures, including total subnational 
expenditure E and expenditure by the national government. Total expenditure TE  does 
not include fiscal transfers from one government to another (such as fiscal transfers from 
the national government to SNGs). We can then introduce the following concepts: 




This is the share of subnational expenditure that is funded by subnational 
own-sourced revenue, which we shall call the “fiscal autonomy” of SNGs.  




 This is the share of total public-sector expenditure that is undertaken by 
SNGs, to be called the “fiscal importance” of SNGs. 
 
The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation is the geometric mean of the 
fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of SNGs: 




⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =× ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
As the FDI is a type of a mean of the two shares OSR E  and  E TE , its value is 
bracketed by these shares. The form of the index (2.1) is derived from underlying 
economic principles in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2.2  The enhanced index of fiscal decentralisation (eFDI) 
 
The above FDI ignores the effects of two second-order determinants of 
subnational governments’ fiscal autonomy, the effects of (i) fiscal transfers to SNGs and 
(ii) SNGs’ borrowing. The enhanced index (eFDI) addresses this issue. 
   6
  Although own-sourced revenue and fiscal transfers both provide resources to 
subnational governments, their impact on fiscal autonomy can differ. While SNGs have 
more or less complete autonomy over their own-sourced revenue, when the fiscal 
transfers are conditional, restrictions are placed on how the funds can be spent. As the 
expenditure of unconditional grants is at the discretion of SNGs, they contribute to their 
fiscal autonomy. The task is then to isolate the unconditional transfers, the ones that 
contribute to the fiscal autonomy of SNGs. To this end, we introduce the following 
notation: Let  ,
U T and 
C T denote unconditional and conditional transfers from the 
national government to SNGs, so that  =+
UC TT T  is total transfers. We can then 
identify: 
•  The difference between the unconditional and conditional fiscal transfer to 
SNGs, , −
UC TT  is the net unconditional transfer. 





 is the share of subnational expenditure which is funded by the net 
fiscal transfers, to be called the fiscal transfer share. 
•  Unconditional transfers as a fraction of total transfers,  .
U T
T
  We use this 
fraction as a premium factor to adjust the fiscal transfer share in recognition of 
the fact that the national government, and not the SNG, determines the value 
of unconditional grants. The larger unconditional transfers are in relation to 
the total, the higher is the premium factor and the greater is the “quality” of 
the transfers from the perspective of the fiscal autonomy of the SNG. 
•  The product of the fiscal transfer share and the premium factor, 
,
UC U TT T
ET
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −
⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  to be called the fiscal transfer adjustment coefficient, 
measures the total effect of fiscal transfers on subnational fiscal autonomy. 
This reflects the idea that when the national government provides grants to 
SNGs on an unconditional basis, the constraint on SNGs’ fiscal autonomy is 
less than when conditional grants are provided. Furthermore, national 
governments that provide unconditional transfers to SNGs appear to have a   7
relatively greater propensity to consider local preferences. In view of this, they 
are more likely to try to transfer an amount which may approximate what 
SNGs would have collected in taxes themselves, if they had the power to do 
so. It is convenient to write k   for the fiscal adjustment coefficient 
.
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −
⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠




The enhanced index of fiscal decentralisation is defined as: 




⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =+ × ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
As the fiscal transfer adjustment coefficient k   can be of either sign, or zero, it is 
appropriate that this enters the enhanced index in an additive form, not multiplicative. 
The enhanced index (2.2) extends the initial index (2.1) by taking into account the effect 
of fiscal transfers on subnational fiscal autonomy. Details of the development of the 
index (2.2) are provided in Chapter 4. 
 
The above indices of fiscal decentralisation measure total resources that flow 
between levels of government. By the nature of these total flows, the indices do not 
consider any distributional effects of these flows. For example, in Australia, the state of 
New South Wales is expected to attract a substantially higher share of revenue from its 
economy simply because it is “large” in terms of its population and economy while the 
smaller state of South Australia would receive much less. Similarly, the City of Perth, a 
large SNG in Western Australia, is expected to receive one of the largest shares of 
revenue and expenditure among all 143 local councils in that state. An additional element 
of fiscal decentralisation is thus the analysis of inequality of fiscal flows. We employ the 
notion of entropy as a measure of inequality of subnational fiscal inequality. The use of 
the entropy as an inequality measure was introduced into economics by Theil (1967). The 
entropic measure of fiscal inequality is developed in Chapter 5, followed by applications 
for Australia and Denmark in Chapter 6.  
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Box 1.1 provides a summary of key elements of the two indices of fiscal 
decentralisation, together with the fiscal inequality measure. 
 
BOX 1.1 
MEASURING FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
 
1.  The Fundamental Index of Fiscal Decentralisation 
The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation uses two concepts: (i) fiscal 
autonomy, the extent to which subnational expenditure is funded by own-sourced 
revenue, defined as  , OSR E  where OSR  is subnational own-sourced revenue, E  is 
subnational expenditure; and (ii) fiscal importance, the extent to which total public 
sector expenditure is undertaken by subnational governments, defined as  , E TE  
where TE  is the total public sector expenditure. The index of fiscal decentralisation is 





⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =× ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
2.  The Enhanced Index of Fiscal Decentralisation 
The enhanced index takes into account the effects on subnational fiscal autonomy of 
fiscal transfers to SNGs. It is related to the above fiscal decentralisation index via a 








UC TT  and T  are unconditional, conditional, and total fiscal transfers to SNGs 





⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =+ × ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
3.  Fiscal Inequality 
To account for the distributional effects of revenue across subnational governments, 









⎛⎞ ′ =− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑  0l o g , H N ′ ≤ ≤  
where  i r   is the share of SNG i   in the total revenue of all such SNGs; and N  
represents the number of subnational units. The measure H′ is a weighted average of 
the logarithmic deviations of the shares  i r  from what they would be under perfect 
equality 1. N  Thus H′ is a measure of the dispersion of revenue across SNGs that 
increases with greater inequality of the distribution of revenue. A similar measure 
applies to the inequality of expenditure across SNGs. 
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1.3  Illustrations 
 
To illustrate the workings and interpretations of the above measures of fiscal 
decentralisation, in this section we provide some numerical examples.  
TABLE 1.1 
FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS IN TWO COUNTRIES 
(Millions of dollars) 
            Value in 
   Fiscal item     Country V  Country L 
            
      A. Revenue and expenditure  
1.  SNGs’ own-sourced revenue, OSR   293 293 
            
2. SNGs’  expenditure, E  412  412 
3. National  government  expenditure  412 412 
4. Total  government  expenditure, TE  824  824 
            
          B. Fiscal decentralisation index  
5.  Fiscal autonomy, OSR E   0.71 0.71 
6.  Fiscal importance, E TE   0.50 0.50 
            
7.  FDI 0.60  0.60 
            
      C. Enhanced fiscal decentralisation index 
8.  Fiscal transfers to SNGs         
9.   Unconditional, 
U T   75 45 
10.  Conditional, 
C T   45 75 
11.  Total  120  120 
            
12. Net unconditional transfer, 
UC TT −   30 -30 
13. Fiscal transfer share, ()
UC TTE −   0.07 -0.07 
14. Premium factor, 
U TT   0.63 0.38 
15. Adjustment coefficient,  () ( )
UC U kT T E T T ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ 0.05 -0.03 
16. Adjusted fiscal autonomy, OSR E k +   0.76 0.68 
17. Fiscal importance, E TE   0.50 0.50 
           
18. eFDI 0.62  0.58   10
 
Panel A of Table 1.1 provides hypothetical fiscal data on revenue and expenditure 
for countries V and L. For simplicity, the fiscal dimensions of the two countries are taken 
to be identical. We do this in order to be able to isolate certain differences subsequently. 
It is assumed that SNGs’ own-sourced revenue, subnational expenditure, and national 
government expenditure (excluding fiscal transfers to SNGs) are $293, $412, and $412 
million, respectively, so that total public sector expenditure is $412 + $412 = $824 
million in both countries.  
 
Panel B uses the above data and presents the fundamental index (FDI) and its 
ingredients. The first component of this FDI is the fiscal autonomy of SNGs, defined as 
the ratio of SNGs’ own-sourced revenue to SNGs’ expenditure, 293 412 0.71, =  as 
indicated by row 5. The fiscal importance of SNGs, the ratio between SNGs’ expenditure 
and total public sector expenditure, is 412 824 0.5 =  (row 6). The value of the FDI is just 
the geometric mean of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance,  0.71 0.50 0.6, FDI =× =  
as indicated by row 7 of the table. 
 
Panel C presents the enhanced index (eFDI), which takes into account the 
influence of fiscal transfers, and its components. It is assumed that total transfers are 
$120 million in both countries (row 11). However, the components of transfers differ 
with unconditional transfers accounting for a larger portion in country V as compared to 
country L, $75 million versus $45 million (row 9). We use these basic data to compute 
the enhanced index (eFDI) as follows: 
  First, the net unconditional transfers, defined as the differences between the 
unconditional and conditional transfers  ,
UC TT −   are $30 million and -$30 
million for countries V and L, respectively (row 12). 
  Second,  the fiscal transfer shares, defined as the shares of subnational 
expenditure which are funded by the net fiscal transfers, () ,
UC TTE −  are 
0.07 and -0.07 (row 13).    11
  Third, the premium factors, the ratios between unconditional and conditional 
transfers,  ,
UC TT   are 0.63 and 0.38 (row 14). The larger value of the 
premium factor for country V indicates that its fiscal transfers are of higher 
quality as their expenditure is less constrained. 
  Fourth,  the adjustment coefficient is 0.07 0.63 0.05 × =   for country V and 
0.07 0.38 0.03 −× = − for country L (row 15).  
  Fifth, the adjusted fiscal autonomy, the fiscal autonomy of SNGs adjusted for 
the impact of transfers, is 0.71 0.05 0.76 + =   for country V and 
() 0.71 0.03 0.68 +− =  for country L (row 16).  
  Sixth,  the enhanced index (eFDI) of fiscal decentralisation is 
0.76 0.50 0.62 ×=  for country V and  0.68 0.50 0.58 ×=   for country L 
(row 18).  
 
Thus, as unconditional transfers in country V account for a larger share in total 
transfers, the value of the eFDI for this country are higher than that for country L. We can 
therefore conclude that, all things considered, country V has more fiscally decentralised 
arrangements than country L. Although SNGs’ own-sourced revenue and expenditure are 
the same in the two countries, as are total transfers, as more of these transfers are 
unconditional (that is, untied) in country V, the effective degree of fiscal decentralisation 
in country V is higher than in country L.  
 
Table 1.2 provides fiscal data on the different distributions of revenue among 
SNGs in countries V and L for the purpose of measuring fiscal dispersion of revenue 
shares. It is assumed that countries V and L consist of four subnational regions: A, B, C 
and D, each with different level of revenue. Column 2 shows that there is one small 
region in country V, region A. Revenue from region B is almost double that of D and 
forty times higher than that of region A. Columns 3 and 4 present the actual and average 
revenue shares for 4 regions in country V. By contrast, in country L, there are one large 
and three small regions. In country L, region B accounts for more than 92 per cent of the   12
total revenue of all regions, and the remaining 8 per cent is spread across the three small 
regions A, C, and D.  
TABLE 1.2 
REGIONAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Country V    Country L 
Revenue  Share in total (per cent)  Revenue  Share in total (per cent)  Region 
($ millions) Actual Average Difference  ($ millions)Actual Average  Difference 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) = 
(4) – (3)   (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) = 
(8) – (7) 
  A    3 1  25 24  3 1  25 24 
 B   125  43  25  -18  271  92  25  -67 
 C   97  33  25  -8  11  4  25  21 
 D   68  23  25  2  8  3  25  22 
Total  293 100  100  0  293 100  100  0 
 
TABLE 1.3 
  MEASURING FISCAL INEQUALITY 
Dispersion of shares  Country V    Country L 
1. Standard  deviation  0.18  0.45 
2. Fiscal  inequality  0.12    0.46 
 
 
Row 1 of Table 1.3 presents the standard deviation of the revenue shares in the 
two countries. As the standard deviation in country V is less than one-half that in country 
L, there is clearly less dispersion, or less inequality of the distribution of fiscal revenue 
across subnational government units in country V. Our measure of fiscal inequality is   13
() 1 log log1 ,
N
ii i H rr N
= ′ =− ∑  where  i r  is the revenue share of SNG i and  4 N =  in this 
example. Thus as an approximate, we can say that fiscal inequality is about 12 per cent in 
country V and 46 per cent in country L.  
 
The above illustrations can be summarised as follows. According to the 
fundamental index, both countries V and L exhibit the same degree of fiscal 
decentralisation because they have the same structure of revenue and expenditure 
between national and subnational governments. The enhanced index reveals different 
degrees of fiscal decentralisation in these two countries because of the different role of 
unconditional transfers in the two countries. In particular, the large unconditional 
transfers in country V lead to the conclusion that it is more fiscally decentralised than in 
country V. However, a further issue is that there is much more inequality in the 
distribution of fiscal flows to SNGs in country L. As shown in Table 1.3, our measure of 
fiscal inequality is a convenient way to capture the distributional consequences of fiscal 
flows.  
 
1.4  The contributions 
 
The thesis makes three significant contributions to the existing literature on the 
economics of measuring fiscal decentralisation. Each of them is briefly discussed below. 
 
  The development of new indices of fiscal decentralisation. A new index of 
fiscal decentralisation is developed that is founded on the economics of fiscal 
decentralisation. As discussed above, this index summarises the degree of 
fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments. This index 
is applied to 31 countries, ranging from federal nations (e.g. Australia, 
Canada) to unitary countries (Denmark, China); from developed economies 
(e.g. Switzerland, The United States of America) to developing nations 
(Vietnam, Indonesia). Key findings of this application include: (i) the degree 
of fiscal decentralisation in federal countries is generally higher than in 
unitary countries; and (ii) fiscal decentralisation occurs to a larger extent in   14
developed countries compared to developing nations. We also compare the 
workings of our indices with the first index of fiscal decentralisation 
developed more than half a century ago by Scotto (1950).    
 
  The development of a framework for the analysis of the inequality of 
fiscal flows. While fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational 
governments are fundamental to fiscal decentralisation, the distributional 
aspects of revenue and expenditure allocations among subnational units also 
have important implications. To deal with fiscal inequality, we introduce a 
novel entropic approach into the fiscal decentralisation literature. This 
framework is applied to Australia and Denmark. Two key findings and 
conclusions emerge. First, in decentralised federal systems, the fiscal 
differences, in terms of revenue and expenditure, between the first- and the 
second-tier subnational governments are typically large; i.e., state 
governments are usually fiscally larger than local governments. This is not the 
case in unitary systems in which fiscal differences are typically relatively 
small. Second, due to fiscal differences between first- and second-tier levels of 
government, the new indices developed in this study underestimate the true 
degree of fiscal decentralisation in federal nations and overestimate the degree 
in unitary countries. One way to adjust for this inbuilt bias is to use 
information on the inequality of fiscal flows to gain a more accurate picture of 
the degree of fiscal decentralisation. Our entropic measure of fiscal inequality 
can be employed for this purpose. 
  
  Policy implications for fiscal arrangements in Vietnam and other 
developing countries. We investigate intragovernmental fiscal arrangements 
in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Focusing on the 
fundamental aspects of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational 
governments, two main policy implications are identified for Vietnam. First, 
the degree of fiscal autonomy of SNGs in Vietnam is among the lowest in the 
five countries. There would thus seem to be substantial scope and merit in   15
increasing fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam by allowing its subnational 
governments to set bases and rates for some taxes, for example, property taxes 
and local business taxes, as in the case of China. Second, the revenue-raising 
powers of SNGs in Vietnam are determined at the discretion of the national 
government. The fragile foundation of these arrangements could give rise to 
considerable uncertainty regarding future taxes that may inhibit the confident 
planning needed for longer-term growth. Consequently, we conclude that the 
assignment of taxing powers to the SNGs needs to be secured in the national 
constitution, so that their fiscal autonomy is strengthened, as in the case of the 
Philippines and Thailand.  
 
1.5  The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis can be considered to be made of three distinct parts: (i) the economic 
context of fiscal decentralisation; (ii) indices of fiscal decentralisation; and (iii) fiscal 
decentralisation in Vietnam, China, and selected ASEAN nations and policy implications. 
Each of these is briefly discussed below. 
 
The economic context of fiscal decentralisation. This section comprises 
Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 2 synthesises the economic aspects of fiscal federalism and 
decentralisation. This chapter includes an analysis of the first generation approaches to 
the public economics of decentralisation, including the Musgravian fiscal framework, the 
Tiebout Sorting, the Decentralisation Theorem, Public Choice and the Leviathan, and a 
brief commentary on the emerging second generation approaches.  
 
Indices of fiscal decentralisation. This section comprises Chapters 3 to 6. Chapter 
3 develops a new index of fiscal decentralisation, based on the theoretical discussion of 
fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance in Chapter 2. This index is shown to be superior to 
other existing indices, in terms of its consistency and links with theory. In addition, this 
new index is applied to a wide range of countries to compare the extent of their degree of 
fiscal decentralisation. Chapter 4 develops an enhanced index of fiscal decentralisation   16
that accounts for the impact of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. We use Australian data 
to test the enhanced index by comparing it against the very first index of fiscal 
decentralisation, which was developed by Scotto (1950). Chapter 5 introduces the 
analytical framework for fiscal inequality. This is used to measure the distributional 
aspects for revenue and expenditure across subnational units. An application of this 
framework is presented in Chapter 6 for Australia and Denmark.  
 
Vietnam and China. This section comprises Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Chapter 7 
examines Vietnam’s fiscal history and reforms with an emphasis on fiscal 
decentralisation. This investigation is one of the most systematic analyses of fiscal 
decentralisation in Vietnam since its independence in 1975. Chapter 8 discusses 
intragovernmental fiscal arrangements in China and selected ASEAN nations. The 
purpose of this analysis is to compare and contrast similarities and differences of fiscal 
issues among these five countries to draw implications for Vietnam and other developing 
countries. Chapter 9 provides a brief summary of the thesis, discusses implications, and 
identifies policy implications for public finances in Vietnam.    17
CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The topic of fiscal federalism was generally introduced into public finance theory 
in the mid-twentieth century, which opened the door to the systematic analysis of fiscal 
decentralisation. The main normative question associated with this subject concerns the 
extent to which fiscal powers and responsibilities should be devolved from higher to 
lower levels of government. The level of analysis associated with this question has now 
developed to the extent where scholars have started to distinguish between first and 
second generation theories of fiscal decentralisation (Oates, 2005, p.349). The second 
generation theory of fiscal decentralisation is only newly emerging and it does not yet 
represent a coherent system of analysis, or at least, it has not been well established. 
 
In this chapter, the first generation approach to public economics of 
decentralisation is overviewed in Section 2.2, with attention given to the seminal 
contributions by distinguished scholars such as Richard Musgrave, Wallace Oates, 
Charles Tiebout and James Buchanan. The main practical issues in fiscal decentralisation, 
namely the assignment of responsibility for service provision, the assignment of taxing 
powers, intergovernmental fiscal transfers and subnational borrowing, are briefly 
examined in Section 2.3. The treatment of these four practical issues in the first 
generation theory of fiscal decentralisation is discussed in Section 2.4. A brief discussion 
of the newly emerging second generation approaches to fiscal decentralisation is included 
in Section 2.5, which is followed by a conclusion in Section 2.6. 
  
2.2  First generation approaches to the public economics of decentralisation 
 
A policy of fiscal decentralisation is directed towards the transfer of fiscal powers 
and responsibilities from the national to subnational governments (“SNGs”). While fiscal 
centralisation is often a response to the demands of national unity, fiscal decentralisation   18
may be seen as a response to the demands for diversity and accountability within the 
community. On balance, the first generation theorists investigating fiscal federalism 
tended to associate the process of fiscal decentralisation with an enhancement in the 
overall degree of public sector responsiveness to a public demand and, ultimately, to an 
improvement in the economic efficiency of public economic activities by better linking 
resource allocation with public preferences. 
 
 In this study, the definition of decentralisation provided by the World Bank is 
adopted: “Decentralisation – the transfer of authority and responsibility for public 
functions from the national government to subordinate and quasi-independent 
government organisation” (World Bank, 2003, p.1).  
 
Among many different economic ideas about decentralisation of public functions 
to SNGs, and the associated issue of public finances under decentralised systems, seminal 
contributions were made by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972), all of 
who laid the strong foundation for the significant discussions of fiscal decentralisation. 
Mancur Olson (1969), through his concept of fiscal equivalence, also made an important 
contribution
2. These studies, in conjunction with the public choice approach to multi-tier 
government initially developed by Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan in The power 
to tax – Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution (1980), represent seminal works in 
the first generation literature on fiscal decentralisation. 
 
2.2.1  Musgravian fiscal framework and federalism 
 
In the influential book, The theory of public finance – A study in public economy, 
Musgrave (1959) introduced three different branches or categories of public finance: 
economic stabilisation, income distribution, and resources allocation. These branches 
have come to represent the benchmarks from which issues in public economics are 
treated by the non-public choice group within their first generation studies of fiscal 
decentralisation. In general terms, each branch is individually subject to consistent 
                                                 
2  This is discussed further in Section 2.2.3.   19
theoretical analysis. Between these branches, analytical consistency is more difficult 
because of diverse and subjective assessments of the relative importance of stabilisation, 
income distributions and efficiency. In the specific public finance perspective on 
federalism, the Musgravian branches of public finance proved useful in setting the 
constraints to fiscal decentralisation (stabilisation and distribution) and the potential 
benefits of fiscal decentralisation (efficiency).  
 
The first branch is economic stabilisation. Fiscal and monetary policies may 
contribute to stable economic development. The key issue for theory is whether fiscal 
decentralisation enhances or detracts from economic stability and compromises the 
general macroeconomic goals of governments. The received view among first generation 
theorists is clear: decentralisation of fiscal arrangement does not serve to enhance the 
macro stabilisation objective, rather, macro stabilisation represents a constraint on the 
feasible degree to which fiscal powers can be devolved to SNGs (Oates, 1972, p.7).  
 
The second branch of public economics concerns income distribution. Economic 
goods are produced and governments typically play some role in modifying the market 
determined distribution of goods across members of a given society. Taxes may be 
progressive and welfare services may target lower income members of society. Again, it 
appears that decentralisation of fiscal arrangements does not tend to systematically 
advance society’s income distribution objectives because economic interdependencies 
between the economies of subnational jurisdictions act to reduce any diversity in the 
distribution of goods that would exist across lower level governments. In the absence of 
diversity in redistribution goals between SNGs, if the demand for redistribution is 
nationally uniform, the case for assigning responsibility for redistribution to SNGs is 
weakened. In short, an income redistribution policy has a greater chance of success if it is 
carried out at the national level (Oates, 1972, p.9). 
     
It is in the final branch of public economics – resources allocation – where the 
importance of fiscal decentralisation emerges in the work of first generation theorists. 
This is so for two main reasons. First, scarce resources should be more efficiently   20
allocated under a decentralised fiscal system, as SNGs may be in a better position of 
understanding how to maximise benefits from the use of resources in their localities. 
Second, the character of “impure” or local public goods, which will be discussed further 
in Section 2.2.2, adds a local (or regional) congestion dimension to service provision that 
national governments may not be well placed to manage. In short, if the “local” 
dimension of public goods is ignored, provision of such goods at the same level across all 
regions will compromise efficiency when preferences for local public goods differ by 
regions, jurisdictions or levels of government. As a result, SNGs have the potential to 
play a major role in efficient resource allocation. In this branch of public economics, the 
intention to mobilise resources regionally is recognised so that the preferences and tastes 
of heterogeneous inhabitants can be better served.  
 
Consequently, within the Musgravian framework, the first generation theory of 
fiscal decentralisation primarily emphasises the brand of public economics concerned 
with the efficiency of resource allocation. When the first generation theory considers 
fiscal decentralisation, such as in the assignment of expenditure responsibility and 
revenue-raising powers, it is primarily aimed at achieving efficient resource allocation 
which maximises welfares for constituencies. In addition, intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer systems from the national government to SNGs and the autonomy of SNGs’ 
borrowings are also discussed in a similar manner in the first generation theory of fiscal 
decentralisation. While the branches of public finance concerned with economic 
stabilisation (to maintain an economy at high levels of employment and stable price level) 
and income distribution (to achieve horizontal equity and vertical equity in a manner that 
avoids inefficiency, and to avoid mobility of households and firms across jurisdictions) 
are considered within the first generation theory of fiscal decentralisation, they are 
generally considered as secondary to the degree of fiscal decentralisation. 
  
2.2.2  Tiebout Sorting 
 
Tiebout (1956) introduced the notion of “impure” or local public expenditures to 
the theory of public finance. He did so to analyse political and fiscal decentralisation in   21
terms of competition among localities, with the mobility of citizens between localities 
providing the mechanism for preference revelation. The essence of the Tiebout 
hypothesis is that consumer demand for local public goods can be revealed when citizens 
choose the jurisdiction which provides him or her with the best net benefit. The 
hypothesis states that, with mobility, consumer-voter’s preferences can be revealed and 
consumers will end up at, or at least close to, the point where their demand for impure 
public goods is met with due recognition of the costs of supplying this demand. This is 
now generally known as “Tiebout sorting”. In particular, this notion of Tiebout’s was 
primarily a response to the problem of the under-provision of public goods as posed by 
Paul Samuelson. Tiebout shows that when public goods are provided by competing 
regions, sorting according to preferences would induce an efficient provision. 
 
Tiebout’s notion of “impure” public goods differs from global or pure public 
goods, as developed by Samuelson (1954), which are defined by two main 
characteristics: “non-excludability” and “non-rivalry” in consumption. Non-excludability 
means that once public goods are produced, no one can be excluded from consuming 
them. Non-rivalry requires that the marginal benefits that any consumer derives from the 
consumption of public goods do not change if the number of consumers increases. 
National defence is the classic example of the pure public good. Once this service is 
produced, it is impossible, or at least inefficient, to exclude any person in a community 
from its consumption (Buchanan, 1999). Additional residents are added to a jurisdiction 
and consume pure public goods without any additional costs. The characteristic of non-
rivalry of pure public goods has implied a consequence which was mentioned by 
Samuelson (1954). The consequence is that the optimal level of public goods provision 
cannot be obtained since there is no mechanism for preference revelation. 
 
In response to Samuelson’s concerns over preference revelation of public goods, 
Tiebout (1956) argued that many public goods, such as parks, are actually “impure” 
because they are subject to congestion (i.e. they are not rival, or progressively less rival, 
beyond some locally defined boundary). When the number of users increases, public 
goods consumption may become congested.    22
 
Tiebout’s vision is in contrast with Samuelson’s works, which emphasises that 
preferences for publicly provided goods are not revealed because the revelation would 
result in an increase in payment to the citizen who declares his preference without any 
increase in the quantity of the public good provided (Hamilton, 1987). In short, the 
Samuelsonian approach considers “pure” public goods whereas the Tiebout approach 
emphasises the “impurity” of public goods. Mobility among jurisdictions is possible 
even though there are some typical obstacles to consumer mobility, such as job 
commitment and family connection (Oates, 2005, p.350). In a decentralised society, 
consumers will effectively sort themselves into homogenous groups whose demand for 
certain public goods and services are the same (Oates, 2005, p.353). As such, 
decentralised provision of local public goods and services is essential.  
 
A significant aspect of Tiebout sorting is its relevance to policymakers, and the 
consequent implications for fiscal arrangements. Policies to encourage residential 
mobility and develop knowledge among residents of public benefits and costs will 
encourage migration which acts as a force that contributes to improvements in the 
efficiency of government expenditures. It is also argued that the higher the revealed 
degree of mobility of households from region to region, the lower the efficiency of the 
allocation of resources, other things held constant (Tiebout, 1956). This is because there 
would be no mobility of households and firms when all subnational units are in an 
equilibrium state – benefits provided would be consistent with costs. As a result, due to 
the pressure on governments from this mobility, production efficiency will be enhanced.  
 
In summary, Tiebout has made two main contributions to the study of fiscal 
decentralisation. First, he introduced the notion that it is impure public goods, which are 
provided by SNGs. Second, he demonstrated that mobility of taxpayers–voters between 
jurisdictions represents the mechanism by which individuals reveal their preference for 
“impure” public goods.   
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2.2.3  Fiscal Equivalence and the Decentralisation Theorem 
 
Olson (1969) introduced the seminal notion of “fiscal equivalence” to economics 
within a general framework for investigations of fiscal decentralisation. “Fiscal 
equivalence” is the notion which posits that, for every collective good, there is a unique 
“boundary” for which a separate government is needed, so that “there can be a match 
between those who receive the benefits of a collective good and those who pay for it” 
(Olson, 1969, p. 483). In broad terms, it positively associates the efficiency goal of 
public economics with aligning the costs and benefits of impure public good provision 
with multi-tiered federal systems, each with overlapping physical boundaries, but each 
with unique boundaries relating to the provision of specific public goods.  
 
The next seminal contribution was made by Oates in his monograph Fiscal 
Federalism (1972). Oates implicitly blended Olson’s notion of fiscal equivalence with 
aspects of Tiebout’s notion of impure public goods in his theory of fiscal 
decentralisation, although without focusing directly on household mobility or sorting. He 
argued that there should be a variation of the provision of impure public goods and 
services from governments since inhabitants have different tastes for public services. 
Oates formalises his treatment of the issue by defining public goods in a manner that 
comprises both pure and impure public good attributes. All that matters is that benefits 
from non-excludable and non-rival public goods are linked to a population in a 
geographic subset (impure public goods) or the union of population from all such subsets 
(pure public goods). From this, he developed the Decentralisation theorem: 
“For a public good – the consumption of which is defined over 
geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of 
providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the 
same for the central or the respective local government – it will always 
be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to 
provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective 
jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified 
and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions” (Oates, 1972, p. 35). 
 
Oates’ Decentralisation theorem has a clear rationale. Welfare is maximised when 
specific public goods are provided by local governments whose jurisdiction corresponds   24
to the subset of the national population for which the demand for specific public goods 
and services is homogenous. If the national government is assumed to provide the same 
bundle of public goods and services across all subnational jurisdictions, then it will not be 
possible for the national government to provide the efficient level unless preferences are 
homogeneous for all members of the population. 
 
Oates’ assumptions on uniform provision of public goods by national 
governments do not reflect reality in any strict sense. Indeed, this assumption has been 
criticised by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). However, it may be a reasonable 
approximate for two main reasons. First, the national government does not have 
extensive information on a diversity of local preferences and tastes. There is an 
asymmetry of information relating to local tastes between the national government and 
SNGs. Second, while national governments can provide different levels or different types 
of public services in different regions, there are political constraints for the extent to 
which this can happen. In this regard, the national government is, to some extent, 
constrained to provide uniform goods and services across regions to avoid possible 
adverse political consequences which may arise from differentiating the level of goods 
and services provided across subnational jurisdictions. Related to this are potential 
constitutional constraints. For example, in Australia, the Federal Government is required 
to treat states the same – different rates of the Goods and Services Tax could not apply in 
New South Wales and Western Australia, even if different levels of public services 
demanded in these two states are different. 
 
Oates’ Decentralisation theorem is also predicated on the two other restrictive 
assumptions concerning economies of scale and externalities. First, it is assumed that 
provision costs are the same when public goods are provided by either the national 
government or all SNGs together. If this is not the case, it is possible that centralised 
provision may be less expensive when there are economies of scale. However, even this 
has been criticised by Wagner (2007, pp.164-7), who argues that economies of scale is 
largely irrelevant to the size of subnational government units. When particular 
government services benefit from economies of large-scale production, large SNGs   25
enjoying economies of large-scale production can produce these services for sale to other 
small scale SNGs. That is, SNGs with diseconomies of scale can purchase public services 
from larger SNGs which can exploit their economies of scale. As such, some government 
units articulate demand for services whereas the others produce services for different 
governments on a contractual basis. Second, there are no externalities in public goods 
provision – each level of government provides an efficient amount of public goods to a 
respective constituency. As a result, there is an existence of a so-called perfect mapping – 
local governments provide goods and services which bring benefits to local people in the 
same region only. This too is a very “strong” assumption because it is, in practice, almost 
impossible to limit the benefits of locally public goods provided in a specified region. 
Externalities always go together with any provision of public goods.  
 
The important contribution of first generation theory is that it reveals that efficient 
levels of publicly provided outputs are more typically achieved through multi-tiered 
systems of government than through a unitary system of government. Welfare benefits 
from decentralisation are likely to be greatest when there is a diversity of preferences for 
impure local public goods. However, the limits of these findings – due to the restrictive 
assumptions used to derive the decentralisation theorem – cannot be overlooked. At some 
point, the level of fiscal decentralisation will become inefficient as economies of scale for 
public good provisions are lost and negative fiscal externalities emerge.  
 
2.2.4  Public choice and Leviathan 
 
The final stream of the first generation theory derives from the public choice 
literature, which reaches back into intellectual history for its motivation. In 1660, Thomas 
Hobbes described the notion of the Leviathan, or to be called a Commonwealth or State, 
as “an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose 
protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, 
as giving life and motion to the whole body…” (Hobbes, 1660, p.1) 
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Brennan and Buchanan (1980) revived the notion of the State as Leviathan. They 
developed the hypothesis that the main interest of the government is to tax heavily so that 
they have financial resources to spend. In this representation, the government is a 
monolithic Leviathan, which always seeks to maximise its taxation revenue. In response 
to this issue, the only way to limit the extent of government oversupply, and as a 
consequence, overtaxation, is to constrain governments through effective constitutions 
that decentralise political and fiscal authority. When political action has the motivational 
characteristics of Leviathan, political and fiscal decentralisation divides, competition 
between public bodies reduces the force to grow the public sector. In addition, the 
“protective state”, which establishes the government as enforcer of individual rights and 
contracts, carries the functions which can be effectively allocated, by competition 
processes, to the relevant level of government. It is hypothesised that if these protective 
functions are all assigned to the national government, this government unit has a real 
incentive to maximise a net surplus because there is no effective controls on its taxing 
powers. The presence of fiscal decentralisation constrains government, encouraging it to 
devolve to increase the efficiency in providing goods and services to its respective 
jurisdictional inhabitants, otherwise local citizens will vote on their feet. This contributes 
an effective constraint on excessive taxing from all government units. As a result, the size 
of the SNGs, and then, the size of the aggregate government sector, decreases.  
 
In general, the Leviathan hypothesis and public choices approach to fiscal 
federalism provided a new perspective on government which highlighted the main 
advantage of fiscal decentralisation as a force for maintaining smaller government. 
“Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures 
are decentralised, the more homogeneous are the separate units, the 
smaller the jurisdictions, and the lower the net regional rents” 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p.185). 
 
2.2.5  A brief characterisation of the first generation theory 
 
In broad terms, it may be concluded that there are two general streams of first 
generation theory, with Tiebout having a major influence on both. There are: (i) studies   27
that draw on Tiebout’s impure local public goods concept and integrate it with the 
Musgravian framework; and (ii) studies that draw on Tiebout’s notion of inter-
jurisdictional mobility and link it with forces that limit the size of the public sector. The 
work of Oates, for example, would fall under the first category, referred to here as the 
“core” first generation theory of fiscal decentralisation, while the public choice approach 
of Brennan and Buchanan would fall under the second, non-core, category. Importantly, 
though, the non-core public choice approach is a “complement” to “core” first generation 
theory, as it relates to the particular question of fiscal decentralisation. 
     
2.3  Practical issues in fiscal decentralisation 
 
Before considering the development of the fiscal decentralisation theory as 
particular issues of fiscal decentralisation, it is useful to look at the main practical issues 
of fiscal federalism from a purely descriptive perspective. This is because theory, at least 
initially, is developed from observations of the phenomena in question. In addition, fiscal 
decentralisation has attracted a special attention from international institutions such as the 
World Bank. This organisation views fiscal decentralisation as a mechanism to encourage 
and enhance economic growth, particularly for developing economies. 
 
The four main practical issues that concern fiscally decentralised systems are: the 
assignment of responsibility for the provision of services across different tiers of 
government; the assignment of revenue-raising powers; intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers; and subnational borrowing (World Bank, 2003, p.3). Every society faces these 
issues when establishing a multi-tiered fiscal system, or when maintaining that system. 
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn. 
 
2.3.1  The assignment of responsibility for services provisions 
 
In a multi-tiered fiscal system, responsibility for the provision of particular types 
of services is assigned across different tiers of government. The assignment of services 
can be unique (for example, a national government is always assigned to provide   28
defence) or shared across levels of government, such as education, which is jointly 
provided by national government and SNGs. The main practical issue to confront is the 
extent of this assignment among various tiers of governments and the composition of that 
assignment. Related to this, legal issues pertaining to the assignment of responsibility for 
service provision have also attracted attention. Should the assignment of spending 
responsibilities be constitutionally codified or merely the outcome of the practice and 
fiscal competition within, and between, various levels of government?  
 
In the case of many developed federations such as Australia, Canada, and the US, 
spending from the national (federal) government dominates in some fields, especially in 
unique areas of national interests, such as defence and international relations. Provincial 
governments in Canada also hold a significant discretion on spending for education, law, 
and order. This level of government is mainly responsible for spending on recreational 
and cultural areas, local roads and parks (Krelove et. al., 1997).  
 
2.3.2  The assignment of revenue-raising powers 
 
The assignment of revenue-raising “powers” across various levels of government 
is an important, and hotly debated, aspect of fiscal federalism. Reference to “powers” in 
this context involves two elements: (i) the legal authority to raise particular types of 
revenue (i.e. a constitutional question); and (ii) the decision by various levels of 
government as to whether or not to exercise all, some or none, of their legally guaranteed 
powers to raise revenue. The most fundamental legal question to be addressed is whether 
the assignment of revenue-raising powers should be codified in a fiscal constitution, or 
whether the composition of taxing powers across government levels should be the result 
of some of the process, such as competition within, and between, different levels.  
 
Again, similar to the assignment of services provision, revenue assignment can be 
unique, in which case each level of government is assigned taxing powers that other 
levels of government do not possess. For example, in Australia, the national government 
has full constitutional authority over the raising of the income tax, excise tax and import   29
duties – three important sources of the national tax system. The dominance of the national 
government leaves state governments the powers to collect revenue from stamp duties, 
payroll tax and some other relatively small-revenue-generating taxes. Moreover, the 
assignment of taxing powers to the Australian states is not constitutionally defined – the 
constitution just indicates what the state cannot tax. It should be noted that the Australian 
High Court’s broad interpretation of excise under Section 90 of the Constitution excludes 
states from imposing consumption taxes. In addition, in Australia, the states have never 
relinquished their constitutional right to levy income taxes. 
 
Tax assignment can also be shared, in which case a taxing power is shared across 
different levels of government. SNGs have adopted the practice of piggybacking either 
legislatively (where SNGs tax bases are defined in national government legislation) or 
administratively (where the national government taxing authority collects tax on behalf of 
SNGs). Revenue collected by national government from its tax bases may also be 
“shared” with lower level governments. For example, the income tax sharing in Australia 
was introduced under Prime Minister Malcolm Frazer (from 1975 to 1983) and the Goods 
and Services Tax introduced under Prime Minister John Howard (since 2000). While 
having the appearance of “tax assignment”, revenue sharing is often just a formalised 
grant structure - a means by which national governments provide funds to its lower levels 
of government without giving them the authority to set tax rates and bases.  
 
2.3.3  Intergovernmental financial transfers 
 
Tax assignments across the levels of government of a federation usually result in 
some level of a mismatch between spending responsibilities and revenue-raising powers 
for SNGs. In this circumstance, intergovernmental fiscal transfers from one level to other 
levels of government are needed to correct this “vertical fiscal imbalance”
3. Different 
                                                 
3 Vertical fiscal imbalance is generally defined as “a mismatch between the revenue-raising powers and 
expenditure responsibilities of each level of government, where a shortfall in revenue for one level of 
government (typically the regional level) is made up for by grants funded from the surplus revenue of the 
other (typically the central government)”. (WA’s Department of Treasury and Finance, 2006, p.11.) 
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federations have experienced different degrees of vertical fiscal imbalances between the 
national government and the SNGs in aggregate as presented by Figure 2.1.  
FIGURE 2.1 
VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCES 
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Source: Western Australia’s Department of Treasury and Finance, (2006, p.11). 
 
In addition, the degree of fiscal imbalances may also vary within the same 
federation across years. In Australia, the extent of vertical fiscal imbalance declined from 
Federation in 1901 to World War II, and then increased dramatically after World War II.   
FIGURE 2.2 
VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCES, AUSTRALIA 
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Source: Western Australia’s Department of Treasury and Finance, (2006, p.12). 
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Related to the fundamental question of vertical fiscal imbalance is the issue of 
how fiscal transfers should be designed. In this regard, the first-order issue concerns the 
share of general purpose (or unconditional or untied) transfers relative to specific purpose 
(or conditional or tied) financial transfers
4. The second-order issue concerns the question 
of whether intergovernmental transfers should be the subject of “fiscal equalisation” 
across all governments for a given tier of politics (henceforth, “horizontal fiscal 
equalisation”).   
TABLE 2.1 
GRANTS TO THE STATES FROM THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT 
AUSTRALIA, 2002-03 
Items  $m   Per cent 
Grants provided to states for general purposes  31,876  60 
 GST  payments 
Budget balancing assistance 
National Competition Policy payments 






Grants provided to states for specific purposes  21,650  40 
  Specific purpose payments “to” the states 
Specific purpose payments “through” the states to other institutions 





Total 53,526  100 
Source: Garnaut and FitzGerald (2002, p.40, Table 3.1).  
 
Table 2.1 presents relative shares of total unconditional grants and conditional 
grants in total fiscal transfers from the Commonwealth Government to the states in 2002-
2003. It is evident that, in Australia, the allocation of the GST is treated as unconditional 
grants to the states because of the fact that the states can make their own decisions over 
the use of revenue from the GST without any discretion from the Commonwealth 
                                                 
4 Within these two broad types, there are some variations of types of grants. First, conditional grants can be 
subdivided into: (i) lump-sum grants and (ii) matching grants. For the first subdivision, a fixed sum of 
money is received and a recipient needs to spend money on designated areas. On the other hand, 
matching grants depend on a fiscal capacity of a jurisdiction to “match” funds transferred from high-tier 
government. It is to say, the amount of matching grants will depend on how much money local 
jurisdictions spend on a particular service. Second, unconditional grants can also be subdivided into two 
different types: (i) a lump sum and (ii) effort-related grants. While the first subtype is clear, the second 
requires the judgement from the national government about the “effort” of SNGs in fiscal activities. 
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Government. In addition, in the case of Australia, grants for general purposes account for 
a larger share in total grants from the federal government. 
 
In Australia, a comprehensive approach to horizontal fiscal equalisation is 
adopted by the Commonwealth Grants Commission when calculating the share of untied 
Commonwealth funds allocated to the states. Basically, each state receives an equal per 
capita share of the Commonwealth’s Goods and Services Tax, as well as the 
Commonwealth’s untied hospital funding grants (“HFG”), which is then adjusted up or 
down for each state’s fiscal needs. Garnaut and FitzGerald (2002, p.51) point to three 
categories of fiscal needs. Expenditure needs value the impact on state budgets from 
differences in the demand for, or costs of, services between states (e.g. due to socio-
demographic and location characteristics). Revenue needs value the impact on state 
budgets from differences in assessed revenue-raising capacity between states (e.g. 
differences in assessed capacity to collect mining royalties). Needs for specific purpose 
payment  (“SPP”) offset differences between the states in their per capita level of 
Commonwealth Government provided special purpose payments. In short, positive 
“needs” are indicative of a state having below average “fiscal capacity” and the fiscal 
equalisation process compensates states with below average fiscal capacity by redirecting 
general purpose grants to these states, and away from states with above fiscal capacity. 
Based on this approach, Australia’s share of Goods and Services Tax and hospital 
funding grants in 2002-2003 is shown in Table 2.2. 
  
TABLE 2.2 
CONTRIBUTION OF NEEDS TO GRANT SHARES 
2002 - 2003 ($ PER CAPITA) 
           NSW   VIC    QLD   WA    SA    TAS    ACT    NT 
Per capita share of GST pool  a 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848
Need adjustments                           
 Expenditure  b -48 -338 -69 357 29 457  30  6320
 Revenue  c -156 69 63 -225 336 579  272  148
 SPPs  d 33 27 29 -176 -4 -10  -20  -465
   Total  e=b+c+d -171 -242 23 -44 361 1,026  282  6,003
Grant entitlement  f=a+e 1,677 1,606 1,871 1,804 2,209 2,874 2,130 7,851
Relativity  g=f/a 0.907 0.869 1.012 0.976 1.195 1.555 1.153 4.248
Source: Garnaut and FitzGerald (2002, p.52, Table 4.1).  
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For 2002–2003, “fiscal equalisation” meant that states with a “relativity” greater 
than unity received an above per capita share of the GST and untied hospital funding 
grant (i.e. Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory and 
Northern Territory), while states with a “relativity” below unity received below their per 
capita share of these funds (i.e. New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia). 
 
The pool for fiscal transfers 
 
The size of the pool of funds for distribution to SNG is determined in one of three 
typical approaches (Bird, 2004). They are: (i) the ad hoc decision; (ii) a percentage of 
GDP; and (iii) the size of spending programs from all SNGs
5.  
 
First, the size of the pool is decided based on the ad hoc decision from the 
national government. As such, SNGs are uncertain how much they will receive from 
transfers. The problem with this arrangement is that it is easily affected by political 
manipulations and negotiations from “strong” localities. However, the advantage of this 
approach is that the national government can easily decide changes in the size of the pool 
at any time.  
 
Second, the size of the pool of funds to be transferred may be defined as a given 
percentage of GDP. The advantage of this arrangement is that SNGs have a great chance 
to receive an increased amount of transfers over years if economic growth occurs. 
However, this approach is inflexible for the national government. In Australia, under the 
Hawke–Keating period (1983–1996), the “pool” of funds (financial assistance grants) 
was grown annually by a given percentage, typically less than growth in GDP (ensuring 
the benefits of growth for public revenues were mainly retained by the national 
government). 
 
                                                 
5  Schroeder and Smoke (2003) discussed this issue in a slightly different manner, focusing on: (i) ad hoc 
decision; (ii) cost sharing; (iii) using formula; and (iv) tax sharing.   34
Third, the size of the pool may depend on the spending programs submitted by 
SNGs. Within this approach, there are open-ended and closed-ended methods. While the 
open-ended method guarantees that all spending programs from SNGs will be covered by 
the national government, the closed-ended method sponsors the programs those total 
amounts do not exceed the fund set aside by the national government for the specified 
purposes
6. The strong point of this approach is that spending programs may be fully 
sponsored if the government has enough funds to do so. However, this approach 
incorporates some fiscal risk for the national government, since it has to cover all 
spending programs (to the open-ended method). Notwithstanding, the closed-ended 
method also carries risk – a risk that the program will not be delivered to an adequate 
level of services. Closed-ended allocations with conditions that the recipient government 
must meet are sometimes referred to as “unfunded mandates”. 
     
In a multi-tiered government system, the national and state governments often 
prescribe the provision and standard of services that local governments provide in their 
respective jurisdictions. Prescription of standards for some local public goods and 
services by higher level governments act to downplay the local preferences in the 
provisions of local public goods and services and may distort the behaviour of local 
governments as they seek to maintain, or to increase, funding from higher level 
governments. 
 
2.3.4  The assignment of authority for public borrowings 
 
Autonomy over public borrowings is also an issue in multi-tiered federal systems. 
Should SNGs borrow from domestic and/or international sources in their own right, or 
should this be the responsibility of the national government acting on their behalf? 
 
In practice, four main approaches to SNGs’ borrowings have been catalogued 
(Ter-Minassian, 1996). These are: (i) sole reliance on financial market discipline; (ii) the 
                                                 
6  The current case for grants that are equalised in Australia involve a mixture of closed-ended allocation 
for spending programs (hospital funding grants) and tax sharing (states receive 100 per cent of the 
Commonwealth Government’s Goods and Services Tax).   35
cooperation among various levels of government to design and implement the borrowing 
policy; (iii) rules-based policy; and (iv) administrative regulations on SNGs’ borrowings.  
 
For the first mechanism, an open and well developed financial market is a 
prerequisite. Also, detailed fiscal information on revenues and expenditures of SNGs 
must be made available to the market and credit rating agencies working within the 
market. The market itself will decide whether or not the loans are given. This approach 
is only seen as practical and feasible when SNGs have significant assignment of taxing 
powers and the autonomy of SNGs’ spending, as in some developed economies. Canada 
satisfies this approach because provinces have almost no constitutional and/or legal 
limits on their borrowings from domestic and overseas sources (Ter-Minassian, 1996). 
Cooperation between the national government and SNGs is the second approach to the 
assignment of authority for public borrowings. Australia, Denmark, Sweden and many 
other countries have adopted this approach. There is a negotiation between the national 
government and SNGs regarding the extent to which SNGs’ borrowings can be made. 
However, SNGs play a very active role in this negotiation. The third approach, which is 
rules-based, provides a lesser degree of autonomy for SNGs’ borrowings. The “Golden 
rule”, i.e. the constraint that SNGs may borrow for investment purposes only, is a classic 
example of this approach. This rule is used by Germany and Switzerland. With its own 
strengths of transparency and straightforwardness, this approach also reveals the 
weakness of inflexibility in specific situations. The fourth approach, which involves 
direct and administrative controls, is the mechanism to provide the lowest level of the 
autonomy for SNGs’ borrowings. Borrowings by regional governments must be used to 
finance capital expenses. In addition, the national government can set additional limits 
and constraints on SNGs’ borrowings. In the United Kingdom, even though the 
administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have freedom to make their 
own spending decisions within the overall totals, in general, subnational borrowings are 
strictly subject to central approval. This fourth approach is sometimes common in 
developing nations where the IMF or World Bank imposes requirements on national 
governments’ debt before providing loans. 
   36
2.4  Core first generation approaches to fiscal decentralisation 
 
2.4.1  The assignment of service delivery responsibilities 
 
The economic boundary of individuals’ net benefits (benefits less costs) from the 
provision of public goods may extend beyond the political boundary of the host 
jurisdiction, in which case positive fiscal externalities are provided to residents of 
neighbouring jurisdictions. The economic boundary of individuals’ net benefits from 
public goods may also fall within the formal political boundary of the government which 
provides them, in which case some residents within one jurisdiction receive a benefit 
which exceeds the costs they pay, while other residents within that jurisdiction receive a 
benefit that is less than the costs they pay. Finally, the economic boundary of a public 
good matches the political boundary of the government that provides it. Prima facie, only 
the final relationship reveals the presence of economic efficiency in providing public 
goods, the first two cases are inefficient. 
 
“Core” first generation theory of fiscal decentralisation reveals the above 
relationship well. However, it does not represent a fully deterministic system for the 
efficient assignment of responsibilities across various levels of government for the 
provision of particular services. Only general “principles” are evident from the efficiency 
analysis under the first generation theory, with the notion of “fiscal equivalence” being an 
especially important concept. In general, five main principles of fiscal decentralisation 
may be deduced from “core” first generation theory. 
 
First, pure nationally bounded public goods are more efficiently provided by the 
national government (Bird, 2000). For example, foreign policy, defence, immigration and 
international trade can be best formulated and implemented by the national government. 
Services should be provided by the national government when demand is at a constant 
level across the various subnational localities. In addition, centralised provision of public 
services also experiences a great benefit from economies of scales.  
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Second, based on the principle of fiscal equivalence and Oates’ decentralisation 
theorem, the geographic boundaries of the diverse range of local public goods should 
align (as far as possible) with political boundaries of the second-tier governments (states) 
and the third-tier governments (local governments). SNGs are able to provide a range of 
services to local communities such as law, order and public safety, education, health 
policy, as well as very local issues such as the street lighting system, local sewerage, 
garbage collection, and local paper deliveries. Importantly, variations in the level of 
provision of public services across subnational regions provide a basis for partially 
redressing: (i) spill-over effects and (ii) congested effects.  
 
Third, public provision of both pure “private” goods and impure SNGs’ public 
goods and services should be based on the size of jurisdiction, and in accordance with 
local tastes and preferences (Shah, 2004). If the size of jurisdiction is considered, the 
principle of benefit matching is achieved because local citizens who receive benefits also 
bear costs. A system of fees and user charges may also be useful and effective for the 
purpose of cost recovery (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). SNGs operate closely 
to local inhabitants so that they are the sole agents, who are in the best position to 
understand preferences, tastes and the amount demanded. Once the “benefit areas” can be 
established, local provision on the basis of cost recovery tailors local service provision to 
the demands of local people. This enhances economic efficiency. Related to this, local 
provision of public services may also result in experimentation, and then, innovation, to 
promote efficiency in public policy for the entire economy (Oates, 1999). This suggests 
that devolution may also have “dynamic” efficiencies. 
  
Fourth, the assignment of responsibility for the various types of service delivery 
must be transparent and clearly understood and agreed by all parties
7. Failure to do so 
results in the overlapping of publicly provided services. Clear assignment of 
responsibility for service provision limits co-sharing responsibilities, where more than 
one level of government gets involved in the same areas of spending (Martinez-Vazquez, 
                                                 
7 The origin of the third type of argument derived from public choice theory – especially the notion of fiscal 
illusion and the flypaper effect (Turnbull, 1998).   38
2001). Co-sharing, while sometimes avoidable, can lead to ambiguity which creates 
unnecessary coincidence in providing public services to local communities, and, in turn, 
negatively affects the efficiency of the spending programs. It may even be used to 
intentionally confuse the responsibilities of each level of government. This may result in 
the fiscal illusion – local citizens may misjudge the “true” benefits and costs of their 
government (Dollery and Worthington, 1999). Two effects associated with the notion of a 
citizen’s fiscal illusion are widely recognised (Turnbull, 1998). First, public spending is 
maintained at a greater level under fiscal illusion compared with perfect information – the 
overspending effect. Related to this is the “flypaper effect”, which is the prediction that 
intergovernmental grants from high level government usually stimulate more local 
spending than locally generated revenue. Clear assignment of responsibility alone does 
not necessarily overcome the problem of fiscal illusion
8. 
   
Fifth, the economies of scale of local production of goods and services, including 
the related issues of local financial, managerial and administrative capabilities, should 
also be considered. This is particularly important for developing economies. As such, 
asymmetric spending assignment may be appropriate. That is, service delivery 
responsibility may be different across the same level jurisdictions when there are 
different economies of scale and administrative capacities across governments within the 
same level of SNGs. However, in reality, countries which adopt this type of spending 
assignment usually do so for political and/or geographical reasons (Joumard and 
Kongsrud, 2003). 
 
In short, the first generation theory of fiscal decentralisation suggests that, in 
general, service provision responsibilities are best assigned to the lowest level of 
government that can meet the service responsibility efficiently (Bird, 2004). That is, the 
                                                 
8  The assignment must not generate inefficient signals in which one level of government has an incentive to 
over or under supply of services. Healthcare provision in Germany is an example. In Germany, the health 
fund from the national government is responsible for financing the costs of hospitals. The Landers (the 
first level of SNGs) finance hospital investment and decide hospital capacity. The municipalities (the 
second level of SNGs) are assigned to provide local healthcare services. In this context, the Landers have 
an incentive to expand hospital capacity to create local employment whereas the operating costs have to 
be met by the national government (Wurzel, 1999). 
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so-called “law of subsidiarity” is a simple summary of first generation theory. The law of 
subsidiarity states that economic performances of the government become more 
productive, efficient and effective if public services are provided by the lowest level of 
government possible (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001, p.12). Economic efficiency and 
accountability are essential features for SNGs’ fiscal autonomy in terms of service 
delivery. As such, efficiency and accountability are strongly linked to the autonomy of 
SNGs in fiscal matters, subject to the law of subsidiarity – first generation theory 
supports SNGs having the autonomy to decide the spending programs within their own 
jurisdiction. This also minimises the national interference into local spending programs 
through the requirements of SNGs’ accountability to those who pay taxes and charges. 
The efficiency of economic activities of SNGs is also enhanced because SNGs are in a 
better position to know where the money should be heading.  
   
2.4.2  The assignment of revenue-raising powers 
 
The potential benefits of “efficient” tax assignment have been an important 
subject for consideration in first generation theory of fiscal decentralisation.  In terms of 
the degree of decentralisation, the following assignments of revenue-raising powers 
represent a progressively decreasing level of SNGs’ fiscal autonomy (OECD, 1999): (i) 
SNG sets tax rate and tax base; (ii) SNG sets tax rate only; (iii) SNG sets tax base only; 
(iv) tax sharing arrangements with two typical different levels – SNG determines 
revenue-split, or the national government determines the split; and (iv) national 
government sets rate and base of SNG tax. 
 
Basic principles for taxing power assignments 
In an influential paper, Musgrave (1983) identified six fundamental principles for 
tax assignments: (i) taxes suitable for economic stabilisation should be national; (ii) taxes 
with unevenly distributed bases across jurisdictions should be central; (iii) personal taxes 
with a mobility of tax bases should be assigned to the national government; (iv) taxes 
with cyclically stable revenue should be assigned to SNGs; (v) SNGs should be assigned 
taxes with bases that are not easily mobile among jurisdictions; and (vi) benefit taxes,   40
users’ fees and charges are relevant to any level of government. These six principles are 
discussed in turn below.  
 
The first three principles concern taxes that should be assigned to the national 
government. Based on Musgrave’s contention that there are three branches of public 
finance (stabilisation, distribution and allocation efficiency), fiscal decentralisation is 
primarily justified in terms of allocation efficiency. The first principle reaffirms this by 
assigning the economic stabilisation branch to the national government because it has 
responsibility for macroeconomics policy. Moreover, subnational stabilisation policies 
are likely to compromise stability-oriented policies by “leakage” outside individual 
SNGs, which would effectively diminish the national government’s capacity to control 
aggregate demand. As such, personal income tax and corporate income tax are suitable 
for national governments - especially when income redistribution is a national goal. The 
second principle is related to unevenly distributed taxes such as the natural resources 
taxes. Natural resources are unevenly distributed in some particular jurisdictions. Political 
and social tensions can be avoided if revenue from these sources is centrally generated 
and redistributed to all regions. If not, jurisdictions with national resources may decide to 
provide local services at a lower revenue-raising burden. The third principle is related to 
revenue sources with mobile bases. The concern is that tax rate differentials between 
SNGs will cause inefficient movement of such bases across borders. 
     
Principles four and five concern tax assignment fundamentals necessary to 
support SNGs. The fourth principle is designed to secure stable long-term sources of 
revenue for SNGs. Because of their relatively small fiscal size, SNGs’ need for relative 
stable revenue flows is greater than that from the national government
9. Stable revenue 
sources also assist with continuity of public service provision. The fifth principle is 
essentially the converse of the third principle – taxes with volatile mobile bases should be 
                                                 
9  Of course, there are other ways for SNGs to manage the revenue volatility issue. Governments could 
“sell” volatile revenue flow to a buyer who was prepared to exchange a stable revenue flow. 
Alternatively, cyclical accounts could be established which are drawn down by SNGs in recessions, and 
added to during booms.   41
national, and tax bases that are immobile and stable should be manage by SNGs
10. 
Property and payroll taxes are two good examples. There is, however, a balance that this 
principle must strike with the second principle – for example, natural resources tax (tax 
with unevenly distributed bases) should be with the national government even when they 
generate stable revenue flow. The property taxes are obviously immobile but they may 
also be unevenly distributed across SNGs
11. 
 
The sixth principle concerns common types of government fees or charges which 
are efficient irrespective of whether imposed by the national government or SNGs. Each 
level of government can employ charges that link directly to the services provided. For 
example, driving licence fees and petrol tax can be used to finance a highway, but not for 
education. When services benefit all people, this type of charge is best administered by 
the national government. However, when the benefits are only directed to a particular 
group in a particular region, SNGs would be better placed to administer the charges. 
 
  All these principles are designed to ensure that taxation and revenue-raising 
powers across all levels of government do not distort economic choices of non-
government entities and individuals. However, they are also derived from the static 
welfare analysis – tax competition between jurisdictions is generally not supported 
because it, of necessity, distorts private decisions. There is no clear and explicit 
consideration given to the issue of whether the dynamic benefits for fiscal competition 
between SNGs generally, and tax competition specifically, outweigh the “static” welfare 
losses from the distortions to individual decisions resulting from tax competition. 
 
 
                                                 
10  Parry (2003) shows that competition among various subnational governments may lead to a suboptimal 
level of capita taxation when governments ignore the “external benefits” of capita flight to other regions. 
11  Musgrave (1983) suggested a reconciliation for the above two contrasting views – the national 
government should only impose an “excess” rate whereas “normal” rates are for SNGs on the same tax 
bases which could be centrally determined. As such, jurisdictions with rich natural resources are only 
willing to join the federation once their property of natural resources is secured. 
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2.4.3  Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
  
The assignment of responsibility for service deliveries and taxing powers across 
the various levels of government is the first-order (or constitutional level) issue in first 
generation theory. Fiscal transfers between levels of government are essentially a second-
order (or non-constitutional level) issue in the sense that they are conditioned by the 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance under the prevailing assignment of revenue and 
expenditure responsibilities (or implied by the constitution). Nevertheless, the literature 
on fiscal federalism that investigates fiscal transfers, usually from the national 
government to lower tiers, is extensive and detailed because the potential for formalised 
analysis of fiscal transfer issues is greater than in the case of the more fundamental issues 
concerning the assignment of fiscal powers.  
 
The essential point concerning fiscal transfer in first generation theory is that 
transfers are either “conditional” (tied) or “unconditional” (untied) and that each has 
different consequences for the fiscal autonomy of SNGs (Oates, 1972). While 
unconditional grants provide a higher degree of fiscal autonomy of SNGs, conditional 
grants actually limit this autonomy. Fiscal autonomy of SNGs in terms of fiscal transfers 
is generally enhanced when the majority of grants from national government to SNGs are 
in the form of unconditional grants. That is, unconditional grants are generally supported 
by first generation theorists ahead of “conditional” grants (Bird, 2004) unless, of course, 
tied grants are required to correct for market failure or inter-jurisdictions spill-over 
effects.  
 
Boadway (2003) argued that while fiscal equity is matched for unitary countries 
when their social preferences are the same across regions, the notion of fiscal equity is 
more or less ambiguous in federal countries because national governments and SNGs use 
a mix of fiscal policies to achieve a mix of redistribution goals. Every citizen is exposed 
to at least two distinct sets of fiscal distribution – one from the national government and 
another from SNGs. When there are differences in taxing capability between 
jurisdictions, and, as a result, differences in provision of services to the given standard   43
among different regions, horizontal fiscal imbalance arises. Imbalance in the fiscal 
capacity of SNGs at the same level is associated horizontal fiscal inequity. This 
phenomenon can be caused by differences in local wealth, natural resources, per capita 
tax capacity, and differences in spending obligations and in the cost of providing public 
services (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001). The main tool for achieving equity through 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers is the mechanism “fiscal equalisation”. Fiscal 
equalisation is a process which reduces fiscal disparities among subnational regions 
through financial transfers (Collins, 2001). The four main reasons for fiscal equalisation 
are identified in Schroeder and Smoke (2003): (i) to fill the fiscal vertical gap between 
national government and SNGs in aggregate; (ii) to equalise horizontal fiscal capacity for 
governments in the same level; (iii) to internalise fiscal externalities within SNGs; and 
(iv) to correct the administrative weaknesses of SNGs.  
 
Fiscal equalisation 
The first generation theory of fiscal equalisation is the most developed strand of 
the economics of fiscal decentralisation. Perhaps the most formal developments in this 
field concern the question of fiscal equalisation arrangements. 
 
Economists first came to this issue of fiscal equalisation because of a concern 
over resource misallocation resulting from one jurisdiction, say a “rich” state, subsidising 
another jurisdiction, say, a “poor” state, through equalisation arrangements. A seminal 
study in this regard is “A Note on Grants in Federal Countries” by Scott (1950). The 
specific concern being that, as labour is mobile, fiscal equalisation will have the effect of 
inducing residents to low productivity (i.e. poor) jurisdictions and away from high 
productivity (i.e. rich) jurisdictions, causing a decline in the value of national output. 
However, fiscal transfers from one government to another have some important 
differences to the case where governments subsidise private enterprises. First, fiscal 
equalisation is, in effect, a transfer between states where all states pursue equity goals 
within their jurisdiction by providing some individuals with a positive fiscal residuum, or 
net fiscal benefits (value of public benefits consumed less taxes paid to some individuals) 
and a negative fiscal residuum, or negative net fiscal benefits to other individuals.   44
Second, in addition to equity issues, the “local” character of subnational public goods has 
potentially adverse congestion effects in very populous and high productive (rich) 
jurisdictions which can reduce the value of public goods in those jurisdictions. Moreover, 
services provided by SNGs may have benefits (or costs) that are not confined to the 
geographic area of the jurisdiction that provided the service. Once these “fiscal 
externalities” factors were recognised, it was no longer obvious the “subsidies” from one 
(or many) government(s) to other governments necessarily lead to a misallocation of 
resources. Under certain circumstances, such transfers may even be efficiency enhancing. 
 
Given the objectives of this thesis, there is no place in this study for a 
comprehensive review of the extensive fiscal equalisation literature. Nevertheless, some 
observations of fundamentals appear to be warranted.  
 
Perhaps the first true classic study in this field after Scott was “Federalism and 
fiscal equity” by Buchanan (1950). Although equity is the focus of the proposition that 
“like individuals” in different jurisdictions should receive “like treatments” (Buchanan, 
1950, p.588), it has an important implication for efficiency too. If all jurisdictions of a 
given level provide greater positive net fiscal benefits to the poor, but do so to different 
degrees, then inefficient migration will result: rich citizens will have an incentive to 
relocate to the jurisdiction where their negative net fiscal benefit will be the least and 
poor citizens will have an incentive to relocate to jurisdictions with the highest positive 
net fiscal subsidy for the poor. If fiscal equalisation transfers result in the like treatment 
of like individuals across different subnational jurisdictions in a federation, then, “like” 
rich people will face the same negative net fiscal subsidy in all jurisdictions, and “like” 
poor people will also face the same positive net fiscal subsidy in all jurisdictions. As 
such, there is no fiscally induced incentive resulting for intergovernmental transfers to 
distort migration. Of course, this is predicated on the view that all SNGs use fiscal 
powers to achieve the same vertical fiscal equity goals (i.e. redistribution of income). 
 
Buchanan’s equity approach sets aside the influence of congestion in local public 
services and the effects of spill-overs. These issues were investigated more by scholars,   45
such as Wagner and Buchanan in: "An Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal Equalisation". 
Buchanan and Wagner pointed out that, for any constant level of public facility, an 
addition of one more consumer will reduce the quantity of consumption units available to 
other people (Buchanan and Wagner, 1980, p.244). This is because local public goods 
may be subject to congestion. Furthermore, given the public good character of service 
provision, people who move to the high productive (i.e. richer) state “exerts an external 
economy on residents of that state and an external diseconomy on residents of the state 
that he leaves” (Buchanan and Wagner, 1980, p.245). However, when SNGs provide 
impure public goods, a point is reached where the highly productive state faces an 
external diseconomy – the benefit to all residents from tax-side externalities (i.e. the 
reduced average cost of public good provision) is swamped by congestion costs. In such 
circumstances, fiscal equalisation may enhance efficiency by preventing inefficient 
migration from poor to rich states. The important contribution of Buchanan and Wagner 
is that they identify the circumstances when, from a pure resource allocation perspective, 
fiscal equalisation is economically efficient. 
 
In addition to the fundamental issues of congestions and other fiscal externalities 
such as spill-overs (i.e. economic consequences of the activities of a SNG that spill 
outside the border of that SNG), a number of other important “complications” have 
emerged in the theory of fiscal equalisation. These include the efficiency implications 
including the correct treatment in fiscal equalisation processes of economic “rents” 
(Boadway and Flatters, 1982, p.621) and differences in the “unit cost” of services in 
different SNGs. When economic rents from mineral activities differ between states and 
they are taxed by a subnational government that is subject to fiscal equalisation, should 
those rents collected by the SNG be equalised (effectively allocating rents on a per capita 
or some other basis across all equalised subnational jurisdictions) or should the SNGs in 
which the rents are generated keep the taxes from that rent? Likewise, in SNGs where the 
unit costs of inputs required to produce local public services are above those for other 
SNGs, should the high-cost SNGs be subsidised for their higher unit costs through the 
fiscal equalisation process?  
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In regard to rent analysis, Boadway and Flatters (1982) demonstrated that fiscal 
equalisation represents an efficiency enhancing mechanism. Individuals will choose to 
reside in the jurisdiction that provides them with a highest net benefit, but when there are 
location specific rents, migration equilibria will not equate with the point where marginal 
products are equal across jurisdictions (i.e. the efficient point), but where average 
products are equal. As in the case of congestion, fiscal equalisation provides one 
mechanism by which migration distortions due to location specific rents can be 
eliminated.  
 
Petchey (1995) has also investigated the interaction between equalisation in the 
presence of both rents and unit cost differentials. His economic simulations illustrate that, 
in the presence of diverse economic rents and diverse unit costs across regions, fiscal 
equalisation processes which equalise for unit cost can enhance economic efficiency. 
Based on a simplified two states model, he demonstrated that, in the absence of economic 
rents, efficient fiscal equalisation will not transfer resources from the “low” cost state to 
the “high” cost state. However, when a state has high costs in conjunction with low 
economic rents (all determined relative to the other states), efficient fiscal equalisation 
transfers will transfer resources from the low cost/high rent state to the high cost/low rent 
state. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that there is a basic issue concerning what exactly 
should be equalised – the capacity of governments for providing services (i.e. fiscal 
capacity) or the actual fiscal performance of a government (i.e. fiscal performances). The 
literature tends to implicitly focus on fiscal performance (e.g. Scott 1950; Buchanan 
1950, Buchanan and Wagner 1970) but in practice, it is generally fiscal capacity that is 
equalised
12. 
                                                 
12 Russell Mathews (1980), Richard Musgrave (1980) and Antoni Zabalza (2003) have distinguished five 
main types of models of fiscal equalisation: (i) the fiscal capacity equalisation; (ii) the fiscal potential 
equalisation; (iii) the pure incentive model of fiscal decentralisation; (iv) the actual performance 
equalisation; and (v) the Mathews model. The emerging second generation theory of fiscal 
decentralisation considers some aspects of capacity equalisation. 
 
 First, Mathews raised two main aspects of fiscal capacity equalisation: equalisation of revenue-raising 
capacity and equalisation of expenditure needs, similar to that which is applied in Australia (see Section   47
 
2.4.4  Subnational borrowings 
 
SNGs’ access to the financial market has been a controversial issue for some time 
– especially in the literature relating to developing countries (Ter-Minassian, 1996). 
Compared with the national government, some argue that SNGs have poor accounting 
and disclosure standards and rely on the national government to bail out a debt crisis 
when there is a conflict of interests between lenders and borrowers. However, there are 
three main grounds to support SNGs’ borrowings (World Bank, 2004). First, SNGs’ 
investment expenditure entirely financed from current tax revenue is inappropriate for 
equity reasons. Investment brings benefits for future generations so that they should be, 
at least partially, responsible for their spending. Second, the mismatch between revenue 
and expenditure evident in most federations also requires SNGs’ borrowings in 
particular years as subnational economies fluctuate. Third, and most importantly from 
the perspective of first generation theory, borrowings from SNGs may foster political 
accountability. In the absence of significant intervention from the national government, 
financial markets will send a clear signal of SNGs’ performances by providing 
borrowings or blocking them access into the financial markets. As a first approximation 
in which interjurisdictional fiscal externality is ignored, first generation theory suggests 
that SNGs should have some responsibility for the management and service of their own 
debt, but in conjunction with transparent accounting arrangements for public sector 
finances. 
 
In practice, one of the main questions of interest to scholars is the extent of the 
budget constraint to be imposed on SNGs by a national government (Ter-Minassian, 
                                                                                                                                                   
2.3.3). Second, the fiscal potential model equalises the fiscal potential levels for SNGs to achieve their 
own goals). Third, the pure incentive model of fiscal equalisation is done to give an incentive to 
subnational regions by providing matching grants to them to raise their tax and service levels. This model 
of fiscal equalisation may have redistributional effects with respect to fiscal capacity and/or fiscal need of 
various regions. Fourth, the equalisation is demonstrated by the national government by equalising actual 
per capita dollar outlays on subnational services in all subnational regions and taking into account the 
difference of needs of various regions. Fifth, the Mathews model has developed on the foundation of the 
fiscal capacity model of fiscal equalisation and explored at various specific situations, such as: taking 
into account (i) a revenue effort adjustment factor or (ii) a revenue capacity equalisation factor. 
   48
1996, p.156): a soft budget constraint and a hard budget constraint. A hard budget 
constraint means that the national government will not bail out SNGs for excessive debts 
under any circumstances. This approach requires the national government to provide a 
clear message to the market – no bailout policy for SNGs’ debts. In this case, SNGs have 
no “incentives” to overborrow and fail to meet financial responsibility. On the other side, 
soft budget constraint means, to some extent, subnational debts are implicitly guaranteed 
by the national government. This approach has usually been adopted in countries with 
high levels of fiscal transfers. In this case, local regions are very much dependent on 
outside-sourced revenue, not their own-sourced revenue
13.  
 
2.5  An emerging second generation approaches to fiscal decentralisation 
 
Oates’ Decentralisation Theorem has laid a strong foundation for the study of 
fiscal federalism and decentralisation, all of which developed from the general literature 
on public economics. The result was what is now called the first generation theory of 
fiscal decentralisation. However, towards the end of the last decade of the twentieth 
century, a “second” generation theory of fiscal decentralisation has begun to emerge, 
which draws on ideas from outside the public finance literature. As Oates (2005, p.356) 
has highlighted, this second generation began investigating fiscal decentralisation by 
drawing on notions from the theory of the firms, the economics of information, principal-
agent problem, and the theory of the contract.  
 
Two main considerations underlie the development of the second generation 
theory (Oates, 2005, p. 356). The first concerns the political processes and the behaviour 
of political agents in which participants may have their own objective functions. 
Government officials may not need to seek the common good as assumed in the first 
                                                 
13 In order to limit a possible weakness of the guarantee for subnational debt repayment, many restrictions 
have been imposed such as no borrowings, borrowings for limited purposes, and ceiling amount control 
(Rodden, 2000). While these soft constraints are moderately flexible, the approach experiences the 
problem of the commons. The commitment to bailouts for subnational debts by national governments 
may bring fiscal benefits for SNGs as an entity; however, it needs not benefit the residents of subnational 
regions when this is achieved by reducing the financial accountability of SNGs and damaging the 
national economy. It is however, very costly for the economy as the whole. 
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generation theory, rather, they may not act to maximise the welfare of their 
constituencies. This consideration has obvious links to public choice theory – which was 
the main “non-core” stream of the first generation theory of fiscal decentralisation. The 
second concerns the issue of asymmetric information and political agents. Some 
particular participants have more knowledge of local preferences and tastes and cost 
structure compared to the others. To examine these influences, fiscal federalism is 
examined from the perspective of a framework on industrial organisation and 
microeconomic theory. Much of this work by the second generation theorists concerns 
the issue of balance between the degree of fiscal centralisation and fiscal decentralisation. 
While the general support for fiscal decentralisation in the first generation theory is 
acknowledged, the dangers of going too far in the fiscally decentralised system are a 
feature of the second generation theory.  
 
The emerging second generation theory has been characterised in terms of two 
motivating issues: incentives and knowledge (Garzarelli, 2004, p. 11). Both motivations 
have contributed to an increased economic efficiency: incentives are required for SNGs 
to do a better job to avoid outward migration of people and firms; and knowledge of local 
preferences and tastes is crucial to achieve economic efficiency when local public goods 
and services are provided by SNGs. The contributions of the second generation theory are 
mainly drawn from the economics of transaction cost, incomplete contracts and principal-
agent perspectives (Garzarelli, 2004). Leading studies, that have been classed as parts in 
the emerging second generation theory, are associated with Weingast (1995), Seabright 
(1996), Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003). 
 
Weingast (1995) introduced the notion of market preserving federalism to 
investigate how competing jurisdictions create incentives for credible commitment and 
lower transaction costs. Assuming a hierarchy of governments (at least two levels of 
government rule the same land and people) with autonomy of each level of government 
institutionalised, Weingast modelled the market preserving federalism in which: (i) SNGs 
have regulatory responsibility over the economy; (ii) a common market is ensured so that 
SNGs are unable to prevent trade in goods and services from other jurisdictions; and (iii)   50
SNGs face a hard budget constraint. The main findings, for the UK and the US are: (i) 
federalism provides the political basis for the common market; (ii) the prohibitions 
against the national government’s exercise of economic regulation greatly reduced the 
government’s political responsiveness to interest groups; and (iii) the prohibitions on 
internal trade barriers allowed entrepreneurs, new enterprises, and new economic 
activities to emerge in new areas that could outcompete interests in older areas 
(Weingast, 1995, p.25). 
 
In contrast, Seabright (1996) introduced the notion of “incomplete contract” to the 
analysis of fiscal federalism. The author presents elections as incomplete contracts in 
which some information, in the “contract”, is unverifiable. Political accountability can be 
an organisational motivation for decentralisation. In contrast, centralisation could be 
more preferred when the mechanisms associated with incomplete contract provide greater 
scope for policy cooperation between different levels of government to internalise 
interjurisdictional fiscal externalities. As a consequence, the decision on preferred 
mechanism depends on the relative magnitude between benefits from internalisation of 
interjurisdictional fiscal externality and costs arising due to a reduced accountability 
under fiscal centralisation.     
 
The starting point for Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) is Oates’ 
Decentralisation Theorem, but these authors correctly pointed out that goods and services 
provided by the national government are not necessarily homogenous, as Oates had 
originally assumed
14. Once it is recognised that national provision of public goods and 
services is possible on a differential basis between regions, a different fiscal framework is 
needed from that developed by Oates. In their frameworks, output provided by the 
national government consists of locally-designed outputs which are determined by the 
central legislation. This is feasible because the national government body always consists 
of locally elected representatives from local regions. Nevertheless, the broad thrust of 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that public choice economists such as Brennan and Buchanan had previously objected 
to this.   51
Oates’ findings on the efficiency of decentralised fiscal arrangement is reproduced in 
models in which interjurisdictional externalities are small and regions are heterogeneous.    
 
Another contribution to second generation theory of fiscal decentralisation is 
evident from recent studies of Australian fiscal equalisation by Petchey and 
Levtchenkova (2002 and 2004), which pointed out that equalisation grants are not 
determined exogenously. This is because equalisation is undertaken with respect to a 
fiscal standard that is determined in relation to actual fiscal behaviour. In this 
circumstance, there is an incentive for the states to behave strategically in their fiscal 
decisions. This provides the basis for an “equalisation game” which takes into account 
states’ strategic behaviour and provides a basis for developing proposals which enhance 
efficiency.  
 
The generally accepted view now is that the presence of the second generation 
theory of fiscal decentralisation classifies, rather than contradicts, the validity of the first 
generation, including the Decentralisation Theorem:  
“although the models under the second generation theory umbrella differ in 
fundamental ways from the first generation theory, many of them produce a 
trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation that is in a somewhat 
similar spirit to their earlier counterparts” (Oates, 2005, p. 357).  
 
Finally, a second generation of public choice theory is also emerging. This is 
mainly associated with the work of Richard Wagner (2007), which shifts attention away 
from “tiers” of government, and assignment of powers and responsibilities across tiers, to 
focus on the competing “polycentric” character of government. This is associated with a 
focus on the process by which diverse centres of government respond to demands for 
publicly provided services in a manner that is integrated within the market economy. 
 
Wagner’s basic view on the evolutionary character of polycentric government is 
more important than the hierarchical aspect of government in which the questions of 
which functions to be provided at the national and subnational levels of government are   52
addressed (Wagner, 2007, p.164-5), as it is in the conventional approach to fiscal 
decentralisation. The process by which governments respond to emerging demand from 
the community is directly linked to the capacity to raise their own revenue in an 
innovative way. Moreover, the focus is on government “enterprise”, in which some 
government units fulfil the role of public service producers and some take on the role of 
the articulators of the public services (Wagner, 2007, p.166).  
 
2.6  Concluding remarks 
 
The chapter provides a very general and brief overview of the main insights from 
the literature on fiscal decentralisation. It reveals the findings from the first generation 
theory, as represented by seminal studies from Musgrave, Tiebout, Olson and Oates, 
“fiscal equivalence”, population sorting, and fiscal decentralisation theorem. It also points 
to the public choice stream of first generation theory and an emerging second theory of 
fiscal decentralisation, which mainly concerns the efficiency trade-off between fiscal 
centralisation and decentralisation. 
 
The key point to note is that the notion of decentralisation plays a very important 
role in the theory of fiscal federalism; irrespective of whether core or non-core first or 
second generation theory is being considered, decentralisation is the primary issue of 
concern. For the purpose of this dissertation, one important implication of this overview 
is that any empirical testing of this theory requires a “sound” measure of fiscal 
decentralisation. That is, there must be a measure of fiscal decentralisation that reflects 
important features of fiscal theory. The development of such a sound measure is the 
subject of the next four chapters of this study. 
 